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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Interstate Commerce-Validity of Wagner National Labor Relations Act as Applied to Manufacturing-The defendant
corporation, the fourth largest producer of steel in the United States, having
plants situated in Pennsylvania, draws raw materials from various parts of the
country and ships approximately 75 per cent of its product out of the state. The
defendant discharged ten of its employees for union activity. The National
Labor Relations Board found this to be an unfair labor practice under the
National Labor Relations Act.' The Board ordered the defendant, inter alia,
to offer reinstatement to the discharged employees and to cease and desist from
like practices, and petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order.
Upon denial of the petition, the Board appealed. Held (Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, JJ., dissenting), judgment reversed, because
the Act was constitutionally applied to the defendant on the ground that a strike
among its employees would directly affect interstate commerce.2 National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S.
L. WEEK 966.

Defendant, a Virginia corporation, is engaged in the manufacture of men's
clothing. Over 99 per cent of its materials comes from states other than the
defendant's place of manufacture, and over 82 per cent of its product is sold
outside the state. The defendant produces less than one-half of one per cent of
the men's clothing produced in the United States. The industry is one which,
for the most part, is localized in a few states, and a large proportion of its raw
materials and finished products crosses state lines. The Board's order and the
Court's holding, five to four, were similar to the order and holding in the Jones &
Laughlin case. National Labor Relations Board v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1937) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 974.
Defendant, a Michigan corporation, is the largest manufacturer of commercial trailers in the United States. More than 50 per cent of its raw materials and
more than 8o per cent of its finished product cross state lines. The Board's order
and the Court's holding, five to four, were similar to the order and holding in the
Jones & Laughlin case. National Labor Relations Board v. Freuhauf Trailer
Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (937)

4 U. S. L. WEEK 972.

The momentous decisions in the instant cases were presaged by the decision of the Court two weeks earlier in the Virginia Ry. case." It was there held
that the Railway Labor Act,4 which imposed collective bargaining upon railroads, could be constitutionally applied to those railway employees who were
engaged in making repairs upon rolling stock withdrawn from service for an
average period of over three months. 5 The Court reasoned that strikes among
1. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § I51 (Supp. 1936). "Employees shall have the
right to . . . form, join, or assist labor organizations. . . ." (see. 7) "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-To . . . restrain . . . employees . . ." in the
exercise of this right "By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment ..
[sec. 8 (1), (3)].
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Virginia Ry. v. System Federation No. 4q, A. F. of L., U. S. Sup. Ct. (1937) 4 U. S.
L. WEx 875.
4. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), amended by, 48 STAT. 1,8 5 (1934), 45 U. S. C. A. § I5I (Supp.
1935).

5. The court distinguished the Employer's Liability Cases, 207 U. S. 463 (i9o8), in
which repair shop employees were mentioned as beyond the pale of congressional regulation
(733)
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these employees would seriously cripple interstate transportation, and then,
applying the standard test in dealing with federal power over intrastate activity
-Does the activity directly affect interstate commerce ?-found that there was
such a direct relationship between cause and result.8 In the instant cases the
Court applied the same reasoning to commerce as distinct from its agency, transportation, and emerged with a result clearly contrary to its views of proximate
causation in this field as expressed in the Schechter 7 and Carter" cases.9 Without questioning the usefulness of the technique employed, 10 it would seem that
a modem definition of the federal commerce power should recognize its plenipotence, at least for the purpose of labor regulation, over industrial activities
which concern more states than one. Although the Court in the Jones & Laughlin case laid great stress upon the size of the defendant's enterprise, the magnitude of the operations carried on by an individual manufacturer would seem to
be immaterial, since the controlling question is rather whether the industry of
which he is a part is more than local in character. Directness of effect depends upon its character rather than upon its intensity." Nor should it make
any difference that the individual manufacturer ships little or none of his product
into interstate commerce, if effective labor regulation in that field demands control of the employer-employee relationship in his plant, although this might seem
to be one link more remote in the chain of "direct" causation. However, these
are not the only implications of the decisions. Collective bargaining is, in the
last analysis, merely a means to an end. Its raison d'$tre is to secure concessions in wages, hours, and working conditions. If, then, Congress may foist
collective bargaining upon industry on the ground that it is conducive to the
minimization of labor strife, there seems to be no reason, with the possible exception of the elastic "due process" clause, why Congress could not regulate
wages, hours, etc., for the same purpose, i.e., to remove the causes of strikes.1 2
In fact such legislation would seem to be an even more direct attack upon the
evil of industrial strife which threatens interstate commerce.
Whether the Court will acquiesce in such applications of the National Labor
Relations Act, and in new legislation based upon the implications deducible from
the instant cases, or whether it will restrict the instant decisions to their facts
is, of course, problematical. It should, however, be noted that the Court has
frequently recognized the need for interpreting the commerce clause to meet the
needs of the nation as it has grown; that when it has become apparent that
on the ground that "the commerce power is as much dependent upon the type of regulation as
its
subject matter." Virghtia Ry. case, 4 U. S. L. WEEK at 879. For more detailed treatment
of this distinction see Note (1934) 44 YALE L. J. 292, 3o9.
6. It must be noted that the decree in the Virginia Ry. case ordered the employer to "treat
with" the union and to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements. .. '
(4 U. S. L. WEEK at 876), in accordance with section 2 (9)of the Railway Labor Act. The
instant cases did not involve the analogous section of the Wagner Act [section 8 (5)], which,
therefore, was not tested. It would appear, however, that the same result would be reached on
the legislation here in question.
7. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S.495 (1935) (holding the
NRA unconstitutional).
8. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.238 (1936) (holding the Guffey Coal Bill unconstitutional).
9. See Note (1936) 5o HARv.L. REv. 307; Note (1936) 34 Mica. L. Rav. 1167; (1936)
II ST. JoHN'S L. REV. 107.
2O. The distinction between

direct and indirect effects upon interstate commerce has been
characterized by the Court as "clear in principle". A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S.495, 546 (1934). It has been criticized as a mere device to reach a
desired conclusion. Corwin, The Schechter Case-Landmark or What? (1936) 13 N. Y. U.
L. Q. REv. 151, 17.
1i.Cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S.238, 307, 308 (1936).
12. Cf. Note (1936) 5o HARV. L. REv. 307, 31, n. 37.
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national control was necessary, the exercise of federal power under the commerce clause has often been sanctioned. 8 Viewed in this light, the Schechter
and Carter cases stand merely as abortive attempts to persuade the Court of the
need for national control. If the instant cases mean that the Court is convinced
of the necessity of such control, any reasonable legislation dealing with labor
problems which are more than local in their scope should be upheld. Finally,
it should be noted that although the present legislation is concerned with ameliorating the position of labor in the industrial struggle, there would seem to be
no reason why the power to intervene, once recognized, could not be used to
regulate any abuses for which labor may be responsible. 14

Contracts-Payment in Part as Accord and Satisfaction for the Whole
Debt-Husband and wife were jointly obligated to the plaintiff's testator,
the husband's brother, on several notes. The husband died and testator accepted
the wife's check for part payment of the debt as full satisfaction, endorsing it "In
full for notes". Thereafter testator expressed his expectation of living with
the wife's family during his declining years, but he died prior to taking up his
new abode. His executor then brought suit against the husband's estate for the
unpaid balance of the notes. Held, for defendant, since the testator's arrangement to live with the wife's family was sufficient consideration to sustain the
promise to accept part payment in full satisfaction of the debt. In re Gillen's
Estate, 6 N. E. (2d) 257 (Ill. App. 1937).
At common law the acceptance of a smaller sum for a sum certain presently
due, though agreed and expressed to be payment in full, was not a good accord
and satisfaction." The reason was that the debtor in paying part did only that
which he was already legally bound to do, and the creditor received no benefit
other than that to which he was already entitled.2 Though the weight of authority still follows the rule,3 it has been subjected to severe criticism by certain legal
authorities, 4 and has been changed in some states by statute or judicial decision.5
In other states the strictness of the rule has been relaxed by allowing some addi13. Stem, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than Ote (1934) 47 Hazv. L.
REV. 1335, 1344, 1348 et seq.
14. The Court indicated in the Jones & Laughlin case that it would not be averse to such
a use of the power. 4 U. S. L. WEK at 971, col. 3.
I. Weber v. Couch, 134 Mass. 26 (1883) ; Rose v. Daniels, 8 R. I. 381 (1866) ; Foakes v.
Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1884); Ames, Two Theories of Consideration (1899) 12 HAv. L.
REV. 515, 521; Ferson, The Ride in Foakes v. Beer (1921) 31 YALE L. J. 15.
2. i WILLISTOx, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 120.
3. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Cartoni, 3 N. E. (2d) 177 (Mass. 1936) ; Oien v. St.
Paul City Ry., 27o N. W. I (Minn. 1936) ; Nies v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y.,
317 Pa. 545, 177 AtI. 754 (935) ; Vandergen v. St. Edmunds Properties, [I933] 2 K. B. 233;
RESTATEmENT, CONTRACTS (1923) § 76 (a) ; I WIL.ISTON, loc. cit. stpra note 2.
4. Ebert v. Johns, 2o6 Pa. 395, 398, 55 At. 1O64, 1O65 (i9o3) ; Rotan Grocery Co. v. Noble,
36 Tex. Civ. App. 226, 231, 81 S. W. 586, 589 (19o4) ; Ames, supra note I, at 531; Ferson,
loc. cit. supra note I; Note (ii8)
27 YALE L. J. 535.
5. 1 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra,note 2, at § i2O, n. 8 and 9. Mississippi, New Hampshire
and Washington have changed the rule by judicial decision. By statute, North Carolina validates any executory or executed agreement to pay in part for full satisfaction; Georgia,
Maine, Virginia and California permit an executed agreement to pay part in satisfaction of
the whole. Alabama, California, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, South Dakota and Tennessee by statute permit a written receipt for, or agreement to accept, part to be in full satisfaction just as would a sealed agreement at common law; Connecticut, Idaho, Michigan and
probably Pennsylvania reach the same result by judicial decision. See infra note ii.
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tional consideration, however tenuous the benefit to the promisor or the detriment to the promisee, to support the promise to release the unpaid portion of the
debt. 6 Among the many types of consideration thus recognized to be sufficient 7
is that of services in fact performed by the debtor to the benefit of the creditor."
However, if in return for the promise to discharge the unpaid balance of a debt
the debtor has neither promised nor in fact rendered the services alleged to be
the consideration, it is evident that the creditor has received no additional benefit
and that the debtor has suffered no legal detriment, so that in consequence the
creditor's promise remains a nudum pactum. The instant decision seems to
ignore this fundamental conception in holding a mere unenforceable expectation
of receiving benefit in the future to be valid consideration. 9 Rather than to employ
such a tenuous and untenable evasion of the strict common law rule, it would
have been better to abrogate the rule completely, 0 or else to modify it through
the recognition of the written receipt as full satisfaction."

Corporate Reorganization-Displacement of Prior Liens by Trustee's
Certificates-Trustee in 77B of a manufacturing corporation sought leave
of court to procure money with which to operate the business by issuing certificates constituting a lien prior to that of non-assenting mortgage bondholders.
Held, that section 77B (c) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act ' empowers displacement
of existing liens, and sufficient cause is shown for such displacement when the
operation of the plant is necessary to conserve its "going value" and to utilize
a stock of perishables, and when in fact the security of the prior creditors is ample
and will not be impaired.

In re Prima Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv.

14451

(C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
6. Barnett v. Rosen, 235 Mass. 244, 126 N. E. 386

138 (1879) ; Lyth v. Ault, 7 Ex. 669 (1852) ;

(1920) ; Ludington v.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)

Bell, 77 N. Y.

§§ 76, 84 (c).

7. Payment of part before the whole is due, Princeton Coal Co. v. Dorth, x91 Ind. 6x5,
133 N. E. 386 (1921), 24 A. L. R. 1474 (1923) ; payment in a medium different than that
agreed, San Juan v. St. John's Gas Co., I95 U. S. 510 (19o4) ; payment of part with additional
security, Kemmerer v. Kokendifer, 65 Ill. App. 31 (1895).
8. Millett v. Temple, 280 Mass. 543, 182 N. E. 921 (1932).
9. The evidence as reported in the instant case is limited to that of the creditor's expectation of enjoying his closing years in the debtor's home. To be material, the evidence should
indicate that he in fact lived with the debtor (but his death prevented this), or that the debtor
had made an enforceable promise to allow the creditor the use of her home.
io. See supra note 5.

ii. By statute many states have given the written receipt the effect held by a release
under seal at common law. See supra note 5. A change to the same effect, but achieved
through judicial decision, is indicated in Johnson v. Cooke, 85 Conn. 679, 84 Atl. 97 (1912);
Finlayson v. Harris, 49 Idaho 697, 291 Pac. 1071 (1930).
The Pennsylvania law seems to be in a state of confusion. Flynn v. Hurlock & Son, 194
Pa. 462, 45 Atl. 312 (igoo) holds that a written receipt of part as full satisfaction is valid;
Nies v. Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. of N. Y., 317 Pa. 545, 177 Atl. 754 (1935) holds that
such an agreement is not binding upon the creditor; West Phila. Buick Co. v. Shuster, 120
Pa. Super. 329, 183 Atl. 75 (1936), by strong dicta, upholds the former decision and fails to
recognize the more recent holding of the state Supreme Court.
i. 48 STAT. 916, II U. S. C. A. § 207 (c) (3) (Supp. 1934).
for cause shozwn, authorize the debtor or the trustee or trustees

".

.

• • the judge . . . may,
. . to issue certificates

for cash, property, or other consideration approved by the judge for such lawful purposes, and
upon such terms and conditions and with such security and such priority in payments over
existing obligations, secured or unsecured, as may be lawfiul in the particular case. . .

(Italics added.)
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Although prior to 77B it was generally conceded that in an equity receivership the court could authorize the trustee to conduct the debtor's business, 2 yet
since the debtor's assets were usually depleted, the issuance of receiver's certificates was the only practical device whereby funds could be procured for this purpose. However, the efficacy of this method was impaired by the dogmatic rule
that such certificates could displace prior liens
only where the debtor was a
"quasi-public" corporation, such as a railroad,8 and notice to the secured creditors and opportunity for them to be heard were afforded.4 In the case of a
"private corporation", and in the absence of express or implied consent by the
existing secured creditors,5 priority could be given to the certificates only where
the funds sought were necessary for the preservation of the property,6 and never
for the mere operation of the business, unless this could be construed as designed
for the preservation of the property. 7 The rationale of this sometimes tenuous
distinction between private and quasi-public corporations was purportedly
founded on the public interest in the service rendered by such corporations as
railroads, and the need to conserve the value of the railroad property through
use.8 Since even in the case of a railroad corporation the public interest was
occasionally disregarded, 9 it would appear that, despite the solemn pronouncement
of the extraordinary character of an order disturbing vested contract rights, the
fundamental purpose of the displacement of prior liens in the case of either type
of corporation was to benefit the prior lienholders by protecting the value of the
security.10 The court in the instant case, construing 77B (c) (3), bowed to the
orthodox view that such "displacement" should be closely restricted. Motivated,
however, by the fact that 77B is designed for the reorganization, and hence
2. Wallace v. Loomis, 97 U. S. 146 (1878) ; Cake v. Mohum, 164 U. S. 311 (1896). Cf.
In re Cash-Papworth Grow-Sir, 2IO Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) (bankruptcy). See Payne,
The General Administration of Equity Receiverships of Corporations (1922) 31 YALE L. J.
685.
3. Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U. S. 235 (1878) ; Union Trust Co. v. Illinois Midland R. R.,
117 U. S. 434 (1886). See Bound v. South Carolina Ry., 5o Fed. 312 (D. S. C. 1892) ; Van
Falkenburgh v. Ford, 207 S. W. 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918). Cf. Ellis v. Vernon Water Co.,
86 Tex. io9, 23 S. W. 858 (1893).
4. Myer v. Johnston, 53 Ala. 237 (1875) ; Hewitt v. Great Western Beet Sugar Co., 2o
Idaho 235, 118 Pac. 296 (1911); ef. Central Trust Co. v. Pittsburgh S. & N. Ry., 223 N. Y.
347, iig N. E. 565 (I918).
5. Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876) ; Kneeland v. American Loan & Trust Co.,
136 U. S. 89 (18go) ; Baltimore Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Anderson, 9o Fed. 142 (C. C. A. 4th,
x898) ; In re Erie Lumber Co., i5o Fed. 817 (S. D. Ga. i9o6). See Smith v. Shenandoah
Valley Nat. Bank, 246 Fed. 379 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
6. The funds could be used to protect the property from physical destruction, as by procuring a watchman or maintaining insurance, or, from legal destruction, as by continuing interest payments to prevent foreclosure. See generally American Engineering Co. v. Metropolitan By-Products Co., 275 Fed. 34 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921) ; Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. California
Development Co., 171 Cal. 227, 152 Pac. 564 (1915) ; Porch v. Agnew Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 727,
57 Atl. 546 (19o4) ; Lockport Felt Co. v. United Box Board & Paper Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 686, 70
At. 98o (i9o8) ; Raht v. Attril, io6 N. Y. 423, 13 N. E. 282 (1887). Cf. Barton v. Barbour,
104 U. S. 126 (1881) ; Newton v. Eagle Phoenix Mfg. Co., 76 Fed. 418 (N. D. Cal. I896).
7. Fidelity Ins. & Trust Co. v. Roanoke Iron Co., 68 Fed. 623 (C. C. A. 4th, 1895);
International Trust Co. v. Decker Bros., 152 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907) ; International Trust
Co. v. United Coal Co., 27 Colo. 246, 6o Pac. 621 (19oo). Cf. Rhode Island Hospital Trust
Co. v. Greene Corp., iso Atl. 74 (R. I. 193o) ; Karn v. Rohrer Iron Co., 86 Va. 754, II S. E.
431 (1&0).
8. See cases cited supra note 3.
9. Central Bank & Trust Corp. v. Cleveland, 252 Fed. 530 (C. C. A. 4th, 1918).
io. Porch v. Agnew Co., 67 N. J. Eq. 727, 57 Atl. 546 (1904); Lockport Felt Co. v.
United Paper Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 686, 7o At1. 98o (19o8) ; International Trust Co. v. Decker
Bros., 152 Fed. 78 (C. C. A. 9th, 19o7) ; Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REV. 788.
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impairment, of secured as well as unsecured debts," the court departed from the
precedents under equity receiverships and permitted the propriety of the displacement of prior liens in the case of a private corporation to be determined by advisability under all the circumstances, rather than by the former test of necessity
for the preservation of the property. Since 77B proceedings look to rehabilitation 12 rather than to the liquidation of the debtor, as in bankruptcy or, purportedly, in equity receiverships, the need for a practical means of continuing the
business is most urgent and is satisfied by the instant holding. However, the
ambiguous language of the Act authorizing the court to allow the certificates
to possess such priority ". .
as may be lawful in the particular case.....",'
presents a serious problem of statutory construction. In view of the constant
reiteration of the sacredness of vested contract liens, this clause might be construed as limited to the precedents under equity receivership. The instant court
disapproved of this restricted interpretation on the ground that since, under equity
receivership, the only "lawful" displacement was in railroad receiverships, and
since railroads are not included under 77B, the clause was therefore intended to
extend beyond the equity precedents. This construction, however, disregards
the fact that, prior to 77B, displacement was permitted in the case of private corporations under certain restricted conditions.'" Therefore, it is suggested that a
more reasonable construction of the clause is found by reference to other provisions of 77B which authorize the court to direct the continued operation of the
debtor, 5 a purpose for which funds realized by the issuance of trustee's certificates which displaced prior liens were never allowed to be used in an equity receivership of a private corporation except with the consent of the prior lienholders. Thus, by reading the provisions authorizing the priority of trustee's
certificates together with the provisions authorizing the continued operation of the
debtor's business, we may find the statutory expression which warrants the extension of the rule of displacement of existing liens, and the result of the instant
case.

Procedure-Defendant Interposing Legal Counterclaim to Equity
Action Not Entitled to Trial by Jury-In an equitable action to foreclose a
lien on crops securing a note given for premiums on hail insurance on such crops,
the defendant filed a counterclaim for damages to the crops by hail. Held, that
the defendant was not constitutionally I entitled to a trial by jury. Merchants
Fire Assur. Corp. v. Watson, 64 P. (2d) 617 (Mont. 1937).
When legal counterclaims to equitable actions and equitable counterclaims
to legal actions became permissible practice,2 the method of determining both
types of issues in one action presented a problem, and the two situations
ii. Campbell v. Alleghany Corp., 75 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 4th, 1935), cert. denied, 56
Sup. Ct. 92 (1935). See also Cumberland Glass Co. v. De Witt, 237 U. S. 447 (1915) ; In re

Burgh, 7 F. Supp. 184, at 185 (N. D. Ill. 1933).
12. 48 STAT. 916, II U. S. C. A. §207 (c)(2) (Supp. 1934).
13. See supra note i.

14. See cases cited supra note 6.
48 STAT. 916, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (c)

I5.

(2)

(Supp. 1934).

1. MONT. CoNsT. art. III, § 23: "The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and
remain inviolate, but in all civil cases
. .
by consent of parties . . . may be
waived. .. ."
2. An excellent discussion of the problem which is only superficially dealt with here will
be found in James, Trial by Jury and The New Federal Rides of Procedure (1936) 45 YALE
L. J.1O22, at 1026.
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have received different treatment. Where an equitable counterclaim seeking
legal nature, the
affirmative relief is entered in defense to an action of an otherwise
3
equitable issues are generally held to be triable by the court, with the usual discretion in the court to submit factual questions to a jury, and if the defense admits
the facts on which the legal cause is based, the whole case has been held to be
converted into one of an equitable nature. 4 However, under the historical general
doctrine that once equity assumed jurisdiction of an issue, it would retain juris5
diction to determine all matters involved in that issue, in the case of the interof an equity action, the
code-equivalent
in
the
position of a legal counterclaim
defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to have the issues of fact raised
by such counterclaim determined by a jury,6 notwithstanding the fact that7 the
equitable issues may have been eliminated by the defendant's admissions. It
appears that the historical, tenacious retention of jurisdiction by equity warps
the result under the codes at the expense of the right of trial by jury. In support
of the result, it is argued that the defendant who interposes his legal counterclaim
to an equitable action could have used it as the basis of a separate action at law
where he would be entitled to a jury trial, and having voluntarily chosen to submit
the issues thereby raised as a counterclaim to the equity action, he is not deprived
of his right." However, this reasoning does not recognize that the burden of
bringing the additional action may be onerous, and, although the right to trial
by jury may be subjected to certain prerequisites such as that of making a timely
demand, 9 it does not seem reasonable to make the waiver of that right a necessary
incident to the employment of an advantageous procedure.

Process-Validity of Substituted Service Upon Non-resident Where
Registered Letter Was Returned Marked "Refused"-A statute, permitting
service of process upon the Secretary of Revenue as agent for a non-resident
motorist who is involved in an automobile collision within the state, required
that notice of service should be sent to the defendant by registered mail and
that " . . . the return receipt . . . shall be attached to . . .the return of service
of such process." I The registered letter, which had been mailed to the defend3. Buckner v. Mear, 26 Ohio 514 (1875) ; Barrow, The Right to Trial by Jury in Civil
Cases in JurisdictionsWhere the Procedure at Common Law and in Equity Are Blended by
Their PracticeCodes (1922) 7 ST. Louis L. REv. 227, at 236, 237.
4. Lewis v. Rhodes, 150 Mo. 498, 52 S. W. II (1899) ; Moore v. Stanton, 77 Okla. 41, 186
Pac. 466 (1gig).
5. Weber v. Wittmer Co., 15 F. Supp. 735 (W. D. N. Y. 1936); Manhattan Life Ins.
Co. v. Hammerstein Opera Co., 184 App. Div. 440, 171 N. Y. Supp. 678 (Sup. Ct. 1918).
6. Johnson v. Niichels, 48 Idaho 654, 284 Pac. 84o (1930) ; Fisher v. Rakestraw, 117
Kan. 441, 232 Pac. 6o5 (1925) ; Johnson Service Co. v. Kruse, 121 Minn.28, 140 N. W. 118
(913) ; Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1391; cf. Sandstrom v. Smith, 12 Idaho 446, 86 Pac. 416
(19o6) ;Larabee v. Given, 65 Neb. 701, 91 N. W. 504 (1902).
7. First Nat. Bank v. Erling Bros., 61 S. D. 364, 249 N. W. 681 (1933) ; cf. State Bank
v. Carlton, 44 S. D. i99, 183 N. W. iig (1921). Contra: Lehman v. Coulter, 4o N. D. 177,
168 N. W. 724 (1918); see McLaurin v. Hodges, 43 S. C. 187, 192, 193, 20 S. E. 991, 993
(1894).
8. American Mills Co. v. American Surety Co., 26o U. S.36o, at 366 (1922) ; Reichert v.
Krass, 13 Ind. App. 348, at 352, 40 N. E. 706, at 707 (1895).
9. James, supra note 2, at 1O47, 1O48.
i. PA.STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) fit. 75, § 1202. Such statutes are constitutional
as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U. S. i6O
(igi6); Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U. S.352 (1927). But such statutes are violative of due
process unless there is a provision making it reasonably probable that, as a result of compliance therewith, the non-resident will receive notice of the suit. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276
U. S.13 (1928).
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ant, was returned unopened to the Secretary, marked "Refused". Held, that the
service was valid, since the defendant had reasonable notice of the action instituted against him. Wax v. Van Marter, 189 Atl. 537 (Pa. Super. 1937).
In reaching its decision the court emphasized the fact that the defendant
had wilfully schemed to evade service by refusing to receive the registered letter.
Thus, whereas the court adopted a common-sense view and one aimed to effectuate the purposes of the Act, it departed from the ancient doctrine that statutes
in derogation of the common law should be strictly construed. 2 Prior to the
present case, which is one of first impression in Pennsylvania, lower courts with
unanimity had declared mandatory the requirement of attaching the return receipt
to the return of service as specified in the Act." Although liberalizing these previous holdings by construing the plain words of the statute as not embracing a
situation where the defendant purposely evades service by refusing to accept the
notice of process, the instant court strongly intimated that such service would be
invalid in the absence of an attempt by the defendant to avoid process. 4 Hence,
if the letter had been returned because the addressee could not be located, 5 or
because the addressee had moved and left no forwarding address,6 or because no
such street could be found in the directory,r or if the letter had been refused by
some third person not acting for the defendant, the service would have been held
invalid and the judgment would have been stricken off.s As the enactment was
designed to prevent non-resident motorists from evading process by driving across
the state line,0 it would seem that the instant court arrived at a desirable result,10
since otherwise a non-resident motorist would not be amenable to suit in Pennsylvania should he refuse to accept the official-looking letter tendered him by the
postman."

Real Property-Cancelation of Restrictive Covenants Where Change in
Neighborhood Makes Restriction Useless-The plaintiffs and defendants
owned adjoining lots which had been conveyed to them by deeds containing covenants that the land should "never be rented, leased, sold, transferred or conveyed
unto any Negro or colored person under a penalty of $2ooo". The plaintiffs
sought to have the restrictive covenants removed on the ground that by reason of
the occupancy of neighboring land by colored persons, the restrictions seriously
lowered the value of the plaintiffs' property and the removal of the covenants
could not damage the defendants. Held, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to
2. Felstead v. Eastern Shore Exp., Inc., 35 Del. 171, i6o Atl. 910 (1932) ; Flynn v.
Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935). At common law, jurisdiction was acquired
over the person of a non-resident only by personal service upon him within the state or upon
a person authorized to accept service for him. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877) ; McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 9o (1917).
3. Weist v. Heffernan, 17 Pa. D. & C. 212 (1931); Lewis v. James, 19 Pa. D. & C. I6

(932).
4. Instant cage at 538.
5. Smyrnios v. Weintraub, 3 F. Supp. 439 (D. C. Mass. 1933).
6. Syracuse Trust Co. v. Keller, 35 Del. 304, 165 Atl. 327 (1932).
7. Lewis v. James, ig Pa. D. & C. 16 (1932).
8. The rule of conclusiveness of a sheriff's return will not preclude a non-resident from
disproving jurisdiction. Vaughn v. Love, 324 Pa. 276, 188 Atl. 299 (936), 85 U. oF PA. L.
R~v. 638 (937).
9. Weist v. Heffernan, 17 Pa. D. & C. 212 (1931).
io. Id. at 217.

ii. "It would create an intolerable situation if the defendant could, by his own wilful act,
or refusal to act, prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his action." Creadick v. Keller, 35
Del. I6g, i6o Atl. 9o9 (1932). However, see Dwyer v. Shalek, 232 App. Div. 78o, 248 N. Y.
Supp. 355 (2d Dep't, 1931) in which the court, without opinion, held such service invalid.
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the relief sought since they had not alleged facts in their bill showing that because
of the change, the otherwise valid restriction was causing injury to the plaintiffs
without benefiting the defendants. Grady v. Garland,App. D. C., (937) 4 U. S.
L. WEEK 837.
That a restraint on alienation of land to colored persons is a valid restrictive
covenant is a well established, although not universal, rule.' However, it is a
growing practice of equity courts to refuse to grant injunctions against breach
of such covenants when changes in the character of the neighborhood defeat the
purposes of the restrictions and make the granting of an injunction a greater
hardship on the covenantor than a benefit to the covenantee. 2 A majority of the
few courts which have considered the question have decided that equity has
jurisdiction to cancel a restrictive covenant where change in the neighborhood
makes it unreasonable and oppressive,1 while a minority have declined to cancel
such a covenant and have thus recognized the continued existence of a mean
ingless legal right. 4 The penalty provided in the covenant in the instant case
could probably not be enforced at law, since by virtue of the changed conditions,
it would not be just compensation for the harm to be caused by breach of the
restriction.5 In such situations, since only nominal damages can be recovered
for breach of the restriction and since it cannot be enforced in equity, some courts
logically reason that it is a mere cloud on title which equity has power to remove.6
In addition, it might be reasoned that the continued potential realization of the
purpose of the restriction was intended as a condition to the continuance of its
existence.7 Therefore, in view of the unquestioned value of terminating useless
encumbrances on title, s the tendency of equity courts to extinguish the troublesome.burden and empty benefit of restrictive covenants that have outworn their
usefulness seems eminently desirable. Thus it is fortunate that the court in the
instant case denied the relief sought on the ground of insufficiency of averments
in the bill rather than on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of a court of equity
to cancel a restrictive covenant.
Taxation-Taxability of Accrued Interest on Mortgage When Property
is Bid in by Mortgagee for Principal and Interest at Foreclosure Sale-A
life insurance company foreclosed its mortgage and bid in the property at the
foreclosure sale for a sum equal to the principal of the debt and accrued interest,
I. Corrigan v. Buckley, 299 Fed. 899 (App. D. C. 1924), appeal dismissed, 271 U. S.
323 (1926); Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F. (2d) 983 (App. D. C. 1929), cert. denied, 279
U. S. 871 (1929) (restriction identical to that in the instant case). Contra: Los Angeles
Inv. Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 68o, 186 Pac. 596 (1919) ; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 2o6 N.
W. 532 (1925).

2. Letteau v. Ellis, 121 Cal. App. 584, io P. (2d) 496 (1932),

17 MINN. L. REv. 227

(1933) ; Clark v. Vaughan, 131 Kan. 438, 292 Pac. 783 (193o), 44 HmAv. L. REv. 989 (193);
Notes (1926) 74 U. OF PA. L. REV. 312, (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 439.
3. McArthur v. Hood, 221 Mass. 372, 1o9 N. E. 162 (1915) ; National Hospital Ass'n v.
Gage, 85 N. H. 335, 159 At. 137 (1932); St. Stephen's Protestant Church v. Church, of
Transfiguration, 201 N. Y. 1, 94 N. E. 191 (1911) ; see Cuneo v. Chicago Title & Trust Co.,
337 Ill. 589, 6oo, 169 N. E. 760, 764 (193o) ; Pickel v. McCawley, 329 Mo. 166, 176, 44 S. W.
(2d) 857, 861 (ig3i). Contra: Strong v. Shatto, 45 Cal. App. 29, 187 Pac. 159 (1919) (rule
later changed by statute) ; Coudert v. Sayre, 46 N. J. Eq. 386, ig At. 19o (189o) (rule later
changed by statute) ; see Stone, Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract
(1918)

18 COL. L. REV. 291, 324, n. I.

4. Bull v. Burton, 227 N. Y. 101, 124 N. E. III (1919). See Pound, Progress of the
Law, I918-1919 (1920) 33 HAxv. L. REV. 813, 821; Note (i919) 68 U. OF PA. L. REv. 75.
5. RESTATEMIENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 339.
6. Osius v. Barton, iog Fla. 556, 147 So. 862 (933).
See cases cited supra note 3.
7. See Note (I918) 3 HARv. L. REV. 876, 878.
8. See CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND (1929)

163-165.
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although the actual value of the property was less than the principal. Held (Justice McReynolds dissenting), that the company is deemed to have received the
interest to the extent that it must be included in its gross income for that year
under the Federal Income Tax Law.'
ance Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 423 (1937)

Helvering v. Midland Mutual Life Insur-

Since the basic principles of income tax law are that income is gain derived
from capital or labor 3 and that in determining what is income substance rather
than form is the controlling factor,4 the conclusion of the Court seems logically
unsupportable. Certainly it cannot be justified by resorting to the unrealistic
reasoning, seemingly adopted by the Court, that since the legal effect of the
transaction was the same as if a third person had purchased the land and paid
cash which was then turned over to the insurance company in full satisfaction
of the debt and interest, the transaction should be so treated for the purpose of
taxation.- As the dissenting justice points out: "Divorced from reality taxation
becomes sheer oppression." 6 Therefore, if all that can support the Court's conclusion is the above conceptualistic reasoning, the result is oppressive. However,
the fundamental reality of the situation, as pointed out by the Court, is that the
taxpayer itself has placed a value on the property sufficient to include the interest
in order to secure the property from a low redemption price. 7 Since the taxpayer
has received this benefit, i. e., the assured ownership of the property unless the
principal and interest are paid within the statutory period of redemption, it is
not improper to tax that gain as income.' However, this reasoning breaks down
when applied to a similar situation arising in a jurisdiction where the redemption
price is the principal and accrued interest, regardless of the foreclosure sale
price,9 for then the taxpayer has acquired nothing by its high bid which it would
not have had if its bid had more closely approximated the real value of the property.10 If this distinction is properly applied by the courts as the cases arise,
the results will be justifiable.
I. 45 STAT. 842 (1928), 26 U. S. C. A. § 202 (a) (1934).
"In the case of a life insurance
company the term 'gross income' means the gross amount of income received during the taxable year from interest, dividends, and rents."
2. Reversing, Midland Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 83 F.
(2d) 629 (C. C. A. 6th, 1936).
3. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 185 (1917) ; Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.

189, 207 (1919).

4. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 2o6 (1919) ; Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271
U. S. 170, 174 (1925).

5. See instant case at 378; Helvering v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 78 F. (2d) 778, 78o
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; National Life Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 1000, 1oxx (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291 U. S. 683 (1934).

6. Instant case at 379.
7. The Court points out that most of the properties were located in Michigan. By the
law of that state the property may be redeemed within one year after the foreclosure sale by a
payment to the purchaser of the amount bid for the property plus interest, at the rate prescribed in the mortgage, from the time of the sale. 3 CouP. LAws MxciE. (1929) § 14435.
8. The Court has frequently taxed a benefit as income received. See Kirby Lumber Co.,
284 U. S. I (1931) ; cf. Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 292
U. S. 182 (933) ; Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 11 (1930).
An additional factor properly influencing the Court's decision was the great administrative difficulties that would be encountered if every mortgagee were permitted to show the
"actual value" of the property, especially in view of the fact that real estate value is so much
a question of opinion.
9. For an example of a statute of this type, see 3 Mo. STAT. ANN. (1932) § 3o63; in general, see I STIMso, AmRaucAN STATUTE LAW (1886) § 1944.
10. However, in this situation the mortgagee's bid is more likely to represent the actual
value of the property.
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Taxation-"Transfer Inheritance Tax" Not a Tax on the Transfer of
Property-The collateral inheritance tax was assessed upon a net estate the
assets of which included bonds issued by the Delaware River Bridge Joint Commission under authority of identical acts of Pennsylvania 1 and New Jersey. 2
The Pennsylvania statute provided inter alia: "the bonds or other securities or
obligations issued by the Commission, their transfer and the income therefrom
. . . shall, at all times, be free from taxation within the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania . . . ."
The question was whether such bonds were subject
to the Transfer Inheritance Tax of Pennsylvania.4 Held, that the transfer inheritance tax was not levied on the transfer of property, but on the privilege of
succession, and therefore the statutory exemption did not apply. Tack's Estate,
Pa. Sup. Ct., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, March 29, 1937, p. I, col. 5.
The court in the instant case might well have reached a different conclusion
by considering the act of giving and the act of receiving as component parts of a
transfer, and then holding that a condition imposed on either is a condition
imposed on the transfer, 5 especially in view of the title of the tax statute. But
on the other hand, for inheritance tax purposes, the right to give property and
the right to receive property have been considered separate and distinct, either
or both being subject to taxation." And since in Pennsylvania the inheritance
tax has generally been considered as a tax on the right to receive property, 7 it can
be argued that a tax imposed on the act of receiving is not a tax imposed on the
"transfer" of property, i. e., the giving and the receiving. This reasoning, coupled
with the principle that exemption statutes should be strictly construed, would
support the result reached by the court. However, it is difficult to determine the
reasoning of the court from its opinion, wherein the inheritance tax is spoken of
as both an excise on the privilege of succession, and as a partial escheat to the
Commonwealth. Following the latter theory, it would be manifest that it is not
a tax on the transfer, since ultimately it is no tax at all. But it is clearly unrealistic to consider the tax itself as an escheat, although it may well be that the
philosophy upon which it is based is similar to that underlying the doctrine of
escheat.8 It would seem preferable to view the inheritance tax simply as an
exercise of the state's inherent power to raise revenue in order to support itself.
i. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 36, §3503.
2. N. J. Laws x931, c. 391.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1936) tit. 36, § 3503, art. XI (italics supplied).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 72, § 23O et seq.
5. In Kirkpatrick's Est., 275 Pa. 27r, 277, rig Atl. 269, 271 (1922) the court said:
. .. the Pennsylvania transfer inheritance tax is a condition imposed on the state-granted
privilege-the transfer of property." See also GiImERT, PENINSYLVANIA INHERITANCE TAXATION (1934) 38, wherein the author states: "The tax is levied on the transfer, not upon the
property. ..

."

6. See Stebbins v. Riley, 268 U. S. 137, 141 (1924).
7. Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. x81 (1866) ; Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179, 185 (I88I);
Shugars v. Chamberlain Amusements Enterprise, Inc., 284 Pa. 2oo, 13o Atl. 426 (1925).
8. An interesting question arises as to whether the exemption statute in the instant case
would be valid if the court had decided that the inheritance tax came within the meaning of
the statute. Cope's Est., 191 Pa. i, 43 Atl. 79 (1899) held that an exemption in the inheritance
tax statute was invalid under PA. CoNsT. (1874) art. 9, §§ I, 2. Although the exemption
statute in the instant case is not part of the inheritance tax statute, yet it would, if held to
apply, be granting an exemption as to that tax.
It has also been said that even if an inheritance tax be considered as an escheat, an exemption in the same statute would be unconstitutional under PA. CONST. (1874) art. 3, § 7.
See Cope's Est., 191 Pa. I, 24, 43 Atl. 79, 82 (1899).
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Taxation-Validity of Retroactive Tax on Untaxed Income-A Wisconsin statute was enacted in 1935 levying a tax on dividends received from
domestic corporations in 1933,1 which dividends had been deductible from gross
income under the then existing laws. Plaintiff paid the tax under protest and
now sues to recover it. Held (three justices dissenting), that the tax, though
retroactive, was not invalid because the legislature may properly tax income of
a year so recent that the income may have some bearing on present ability to pay
the tax, and, subject to this limitation, may go back at least to the most recent
year for which returns are available. Welch v. Henry, 271 N. W. 68 (Wis.
1937).
It is conceded that the legislature may levy a retroactive tax on the untaxed
income of the year of enactment 2 and even on the income of the previous year.3
But it has been suggested that, inasmuch as income cannot be accurately computed until after the end of the fiscal year and hence no tax can be paid until the
following year, neither tax is really retroactive in effect. 4 However, the Supreme
Court has termed retrospective the usual income tax statute which includes the
income of the year of enactment, but has held that it was, nevertheless, valid.5
This holding was predicated on a dictum in the Stockdale case 6 and provided
the authority for a later decision, that "gains from prior but recent transactions" 7
were a valid basis for a tax. However, in no case has the tax been levied on
untaxed income received earlier than the year preceding the enactment of the
statute. Following these decisions, the Wisconsin courts have upheld retroactive
taxes on untaxed income of the previous year 8 and even of two years prior to
the statute." On the other hand, retroactive gift taxes, which would seem to
differ little from a retroactive tax on income of past years, have been held invalid on the ground that they were unfair since the donor could have had no
premonition or warning of the tax. 10 As the court's conclusion implies, the
question how far back a retroactive income tax may reach depends on what the
court thinks is reasonable. In this regard, it seems that once a person has paid
a tax on income and has subsequently allocated that income to some use, it
is grossly unfair to subject him to further taxation which could not have been
contemplated nor provided for in the distribution of his income." Therefore, to
go beyond the limits of the actual holdings in the decided cases and, as was done
in this case, to levy a tax on incomes received in years for which income taxes
have been duly paid, would seem to be an arbitrary and unreasonable confiscation
of accumulated property 12 without due process of law.' 3
i. Wisconsin Laws, 1935, c. 15, § 6.
2. Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U. S. 339 (1918); Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W.
83o (1912). For history of retroactive laws, see Smead, The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation.: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence (1936) 2o MINN. L. REV. 775.
3. West v. Tax Comm., 207 Wis. 557, 242 N. W. 165 (932). See Stockdale v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 20 Wall. 323, 331 (U. S. 1873).
4. Smith, Retroactive Income Taxation (1923) 33 YALE L. J. 35.
5. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. R., 24o U. S. I (1916).
6. Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 20 Wall. 323, 331 (U. S. 1873).
7. Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409 (1930).
8. Income Tax Cases, 148 Wis. 456, 134 N. W. 83o (1912).
9. Appeal of Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528, 259 N. W. 700 (935).
This case may be distin-

guished since, due to Wisconsin's method of computing taxable income on a three year basis,
the new tax, assailed as retroactive, affected only that part of the income of the previous two
years on which a tax had been levied but not collected. The three year rule was abandoned in
Wisconsin in 1931, Wis. STAT. (93)

§ 71.10 (IM) (a) ; consequently the income taxed in

the instant case was not affected thereby.
io. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142 (1927).
ii. See Neuhoff, Retrospective Tax Laws (1935) 21 ST. Louis L. Rv. i, Io.
12. First Nat. Bank of Covington v. Covington, 103 Fed. 523 (C. C. Ky. 1900).
13. U. S. CoNsT. Art. V; id. Amend. XIV.
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Torts--Landlord Not Liable in Tort for Disrepair Where He Had
Contracted to Repair-Landlord made an oral lease of premises, the cellar
stairway of which was in an obviously defective and decayed condition. Both at
the time of and subsequent to the making of the lease, an agent of the owner
orally promised to repair. The tenant's wife, who was also his employee, suffered injuries as a result of the collapse of the stairway. In a suit by the tenant
and his wife against the landlord, a directed verdict against the tenant and judgment non obstante veredicto against the wife were entered. Held (Maxey, J.,
dissenting), that even if the wife was not contributorily negligent,1 there could
be no recovery since there is no liability in tort for breach of a lessor's contract
to repair, and since the condition of the stairwaydid not amount to a nuisance.
Harris v. Lewistown Trust Co., Pa. Sup. Ct., March 29, 1937.
Although it had never been expressly so decided by the appellate courts of
Pennsylvania, it had been assumed, by virtue of express dicta to that effect, that
a lessor was liable in tort to the tenant, or to one on the premises with the tenant's consent, for injuries resulting from a failure to perform a contract to repair. 2 In the jurisdictional conflict of authority, a slight numerical majority
have followed the older rule denying liability.8 The Restatement of Torts has
adopted the minority view permitting a recovery in tort.4 Thus, the Pennsylvania court has definitely followed the majority rule in denying recovery, and at
the same time has rejected the authority of the Restatement, as well as dicta in
both appellate and lower courts.5 Of somewhat more significance is the express
overruling of the much discussed Deutsch v. Max,6 where an obviously defective balustrade was regarded as a "nuisance" in respect to an employee of the
tenant injured on the premises. In a previous issue of the REVIEW 7 that decision had been severely criticized as being an extension of the landlord's tort
liability unwarranted from the standpoint of precedent or of social and economic
desirability.8 It is interesting to note that in the short space of less than two
i. The desire of the court to settle the legal status of the landlord in respect to injuries
to third persons was apparent from its willingness to assume the absence of contributory fault,
although there was evidence of negligence on the part of the wife.
2. See Deutsch v. Max, 318 Pa. 450, 453, 178 Atl. 481, 482 (1935) ; Davis v. Alsop, 315
Pa. 28, 29, 172 Atl. 135 (934)

; Mitchell v. Sinn, 308 Pa. I, 4, 161 Atl. 538 (1932) ; Cun-

ningham v. Rogers, 225 Pa. 832, 136, 73 Atl. 1o94, 1o96 (igog) ; Terry v. Bornstein, 22 Pa.
D. & C. 453, 455 (1935). Contra: Weidner v. Roeper, 25 Pa. Dist. 876 (196) ; see Hahn v.
Roach, 7 North. Co. Rep. 21 (Pa. 1897).
3. Jacobson v. Leaventhal, 128 Me. 424, 148 Atl. 281 (193o) ; Carroll v. Intercolonial
Club of Boston, 243 Mass. 380, 137 N. E. 656 (1923) ; Kuyk v. Green, 219 Mich. 423, 189
N. W. 25 (1922) ; Dustin v. Curtis, 74 N. H. 266, 67 Atl. 220 (19o7) ; Cullings v. Goetz, 256
N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931) ; Burdick v. Cheadle, 26 Ohio St. 393 (875) ; Cavalier v.
Pope, [19o6] A. C. 428; cf. Ryal v. Kidwell, [1913] 3 K B. 123; but cf. Payne v. Rogers,
[1794] 2 H. BI. 350.

Among the cases holding liability are: Stillwell v. South Louisville Land Co., 22 Ky. L.
Rep. 785, 58 S. W. 696 (igoo) ; Robinson v. Heil, 128 Md. 645, 98 Atl. 195 (1916) ; Barron
v. Liedloff, 95 Minn. 474, 804 N. W. 289 (9o5) ; Ashmun v. Nichols, 92 Ore. 223, 178 Pac.
234 (igig), aff'd on rehearing, 92 Ore. 223, i8o Pac. 510 (igig) ; Merchants Cotton Press
etc. Co. v. Miller, 135 Tenn. 187, 186 S. W. 510 (1916) ; Lowe v. O'Brien, 77 Wash. 677, 138
Pac. 295 (1914) ; Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N. W. 489 (1914) ; cf. Collinson v. Curtner, 41 Ark. 122, 216 S. W. lO59 (igig).

4. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 357.
5. See cases cited supra note 2.
6. 318 Pa. 450, 178 At. 481 (I935).
7. Eldredge, Landlord's Tort Liability for Disrepair (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 467.
This article was cited by the majority in the instant case.
8. Compare the comment on this case in Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts (1937) 5o HtAv.
L. REV. 725, 745.
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years, the Pennsylvania law has shifted from the one extreme of liability of the
lessor in the absence of a contract to repair,9 to the other extreme of non-liability
even in the presence of a contract to repair 10

Torts-Right of Real Party Plaintiff to Maintain a Death Action ini,
Name of Statutory Recipient of the Right of Action-In an action under the
Pennsylvania Death Act, the declaration, filed by the decederlt's mother, set forth
that the decedent had been deserted by her husband more than a year before
her death and that she had died childless. The statute appoints the surviving
spouse as the proper party to bring suit for a wrongful death, and provides that
the damages received shall be distributed among certain named relatives in the
same proportions as the sum would be disposed of by the intestate laws of the
state.1 Under the intestate laws, the decedent's husband was precluded from
taking any share of her estate.2 Defendant objected to the declaration on the
ground that the decedent's mother was not the proper party plaintiff. Held, that
the husband was the proper nominal plaintiff, but leave was given the mother to
amend the declaration and bring the suit in the husband's name.3 McFadden v.
May, 189 Atl. 483 (Pa. 1937).
The instant case presented the court with a novel problem because of the
peculiar nature of the Pennsylvania Death Act.4 Under those death statutes
providing that the damages shall be awarded to those named relatives who bring
suit, a reasonable interpretation of the words would almost necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the deserting husband might pocket whatever damages he is able
to prove. 5 Even the provision for distribution according to the intestate laws
would not, of itself, complicate the problem if, as in most death statutes, 6 the
decedent's personal representative were appointed to maintain the action for the
9. Only one other American court has held that a landlord was liable in tort for disrepair,
in the absence of a covenant to repair. Bailey v. Kelley, 86 Kan. 9ii, 122 Pac. 1o27 (I912)
(defective cistern cover; nuisance). And it is interesting to note that this court, also, felt
called upon to reverse itself a short time later, on a rehearing. Bailey v. Kelley, 93 Kan. 723,
145 Pac. 556 (igi5). See Eldredge, supra note 7, at 476.
io. Apparently only one justice changed his opinion: in Deutsch v. Max, the decision was
by a four to two vote, Maxey, J. writing for the majority, with Linn, J. concurring; the instant decision was by a six to one vote, Linn, J., the two new justices, Barnes and Stern, Kephart, C. J., who did not vote in the former case, and the two formerly dissenting justices, all
concurring in the majority.
I. "The persons entitled to recover damages for any injuries causing death shall
be the husband, widow, children, or parents of the deceased, and no other relatives . . . and
the sum recovered shall go to them in the proportion they would take his or her personal estate
in the case of intestacy." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 12, § i6o2.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, i93i) tit. 20, §41.

3. The court ruled, however, that the defendant would have a valid defense if he had
settled with the husband in good faith.
4. An examination of the analytical table of death statutes contained in TIFFANY, DEATH
BY WRONGFUL AcT (2d ed. 1913) xix-lxxi, leads to the conclusion that the Pennsylvania
Death Statute is the only one which combines the following two features: (I) The bestowal
of the right of action upon certain of the beneficiaries with (2) the requirement that the proceeds of the suit be divided with other surviving relatives. Frequently the right to join as
a party plaintiff is given to all the beneficiaries, or, when the damages are divided according
to the intestacy laws, the right of action is given to the decedent's personal representative
rather than to any of the beneficiaries.
5. Cole v. Mayne, I22 Fed. 836 (W. D. Mo. i9oi ) ; Napier's Adm'r v. Napier's Adm'r,
2io Ky. 163, 275 S. W. 379 (1925) ; Koontz v. Fleming, I7 Tenn. App. i, 65 S. W. (2d) 821
(i933). Contra: Lytle v. Southern Ry., I7I S. C. 221, 171 S. E. 42 (1933) (holding that the
word "widow" excludes an adulterous wife).
6. TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 4, at § 90.
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benefit of the designated relatives because, then, the deserting spouse would not
enter into the picture at all.7 But the Pennsylvania statute has been construed to
confer the newly-created right of action exclusively upon the individual (or individuals) comprising one of the three distinct classes which are listed in order of
preference, namely, the spouse, the children, or the parents." This construction
of the statute has been adhered to to such an extent that the disqualification of a
spouse to maintain an action has been held to prevent any recovery for the wrongful death, even though the beneficiaries of the second class, the children, were not
so disqualifiedY On the other hand, nonjoinder by one of the class of beneficiaries receiving the right of action will not prevent a recovery by the other.'0
However, the instant case is the first to come before an appellate court of Pennsylvania in which the recipient of the right of action, although not disqualified to
bring the action, has been deprived of the right to share in the damages recovered.' 1 By means of this distinction, the court was able to remove this case from
any controlling precedent, and thus to achieve a manifestly just2 and desirable
result which clearly effectuates the purpose of the death statute.'
7. Indianapolis & C. Tract. Co. v. Thompson, 81 Ind. App. 498, 134 N. E. 514 (1922).
8. Haughey v. Pittsburg Rys., 21o Pa. 367, 59 Atl. 1112 (I9O4) ; Birch v. Pittsburg, etc.

Ry., 165 Pa. 339, 30 Atl. 826 (1895).
9. Di Paolo v. Laquin Lumber Co., 178 Fed. 877 (M. D. Pa. igio). It has been held

that the recipient of the right of action may settle with the defendant as he sees fit, and the
rights of the other beneficiaries are then limited to their share of the settlement fund. Shambach v. Middlecreek Electric Co., 232 Pa. 641, 81 Atl. 802 (1911). Also, that the recipient
can let the right die (action must be brought within a year of the death; PA. STAT. ANN.
[Purdon, 1931] tit. 12, § 16o3), and the other beneficiaries will be helpless. Marsh v. Western N. Y. & Pa. R. R., 204 Pa. 229, 53 At!. iOOl (19o3).
io. Kerr v. Pennsylvania R. R., 169 Pa. 95, 32 Atl. 96 (1895).
ii. In Kephart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 16 Pa. Dist. 756 (907), the plaintiff, the decedent's
father, was nonsuited by the trial judge because there were a wife and children, even though
decedent had been living apart from them.
12. In the interesting opinion of Gaydos v. Domabyl, 3O Pa. 523, 529, 152 At. 549, 551
(193o) it is pointed out that the purpose of death statutes is to reimburse a decedent's family, within limitations, for their loss. And the instant court states that the recipient of the
right of action is meant to represent the family for this purpose. Instant case at 487.

